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FEDERAL PRoCEDURE-APPELLA'l'E PRA.cnCE-DuTY or= THE Comt'l' op
APPEALS 'l'O GRANT REHEARINGS EN B.ANo-In a suit for accounting, petitioners
were denied relief in the district court1 and a division of the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit ·affirmed by a two-to-one vote.2 Petitioners then applied
for a rehearing before the court of appeals en bane. With one dissent, the
rehearing was denied by the division, and the request that the rehearing be
en bane was stricken as "being without authority in law or in the rules or
practice of the court.''3 Petitioners moved to vacate the order denying the
request for a rehearing en bane on the ground that such a request was authorized by statute4 and required the attention of the full court. The court of
appeals, en bane, refused to consider the motion on its merits.5 On certiorari
from the Supreme Court, held, orders of the division and full court vacated
and cause remanded for further proceedings.6 Though petitioners have no
statutory right to compel each member of the full court to give formal consideration to an application for a rehearing en bane, the procedure ·adopted
by the court of appeals for the exercise of the en bane power should not
arbitrarily deny consideration of a litigant's suggestion that his case is an
appropriate one to be heard by the full court. Western Pacific R. Corp. v.
Western Pacific R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656 (1953).
To accommodate the different volumes of litigation, the several circuits
vary in membership from three to nine judges.7 Although cases are normally
heard and determined by a panel or division of not more than three judges,
the Supreme Court has held that the court of appeals may properly hear or

1 Western

Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., (D.C. Cal. 1949) 85 F. Supp. 868.
2Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., (9th Cir. 1952) 197 .F. (2d) 994.
3 Id. at 1012.
428 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §46(c) reads: "Cases and controversies shall be beard
and determined by a comt or division 0£ not more than three judges, unless a bearing or
rehearing before the coutt in bane is ordered by a majority 0£ the circuit judges of the
circuit who are in active service. A comt in bane shall consist of all active circuit judges of
the circuit."
5Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., (9th Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 994
at 1013. The circuit thus followed the practice established by divisions of the Ninth Circuit in Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 256;
Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Myers, (9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 1008; Kronberg v. Hale,
(9th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 767; Bridges v. United States, (9th Cir. 1952) 201 F. (2d)
254.
6 In separate opinions, Justice Frankfurter conCUIIed, principal case at 268, and Justice
Jackson dissented, principal case at 273.
728 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §44(a).
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rehear cases en banc,8 and this rule has been codi6.ed9 in section 46(c) of the
Judicial Code.10 The need for rehearings en bane by those courts which sit
in divisions11 stems primarily from the possibility of intra-circuit confficts12
which must either be resolved or avoided. Similarly, questions of importance13
or cases of magnitude14 make desirable the authoritative detennination of the
full court. Although to some extent rehearings by the full court tend to
defeat the purpose of appointing additional judges to overburdened circuits,
it would seem that detenninations en bane are appropriate whenever it is
likely that a majority of all the active judges would reach a result different
from that reached by the panel assigned to hear the case.15 It is in attempting
to define rules governing the procedure by which the en bane power is to be
exercised that difficulties arise,16 for the language of section 46(c) gives no
direction as to the procedure to be followed.17 The decision of the principal
case makes clear that the en bane power is t~ be exercised at the discretion
of the court of appeals, there being no statutory right in a defeated party to
compel each member of the full court to give formal consideration to a petition
for rehearing en banc.18 Nevertheless, in the exercise of its "general power
to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,"19 the Supreme
Court further holds that whether the responsibility for the initiation of rehearings en bane is retained by the full court or delegated to the division,
STe.....1:ile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62 S.Ct. 272 (1941),
affirming the decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and thereby overruling
the earlier confilcting decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, (9th
Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 867. See also United States ex rel. Robinson v. Johnston, 316 U.S.
649, 62 S.Ct. 1302 (1942), and Civil Aeronautics Board v. American Air Transport, Inc.,
344 U.S. 4, 73 S.Ct. 2 (1952).
o See reviser's notes, H. Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st sess., appx., p. A6 (1947): "This
section preserves the interpretation established by the Textile Mills case, but provides in
subsection (c) that cases shall be heard by a court of not more than three judges unless
the court has provided for hearing in bane."
10 Note 4 supra.
11 The First and Fourth Circuits continue to have only three-judge membership. See
28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §44(a).
12 Compare Bartels v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., (5th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d)
813, with In re Henderson, (5th Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 820 (confilcting decisions on the
same day due to change of one judge in panel deciding cases).
13 Ale.=der v. United States, (9th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 867.
14 The principal case involved the disposition of over $21,000,000 and required the
application oE novel statutoi:y language affecting the fields of bankruptcy and taxes.
16 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Pope in Brac1Iey Min. Co. v. Boice, (9th Cir.
1952) 198 F. (2d) 790 at 792.
10 In determining the cases in which to sit en bane, two methods have been followed
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: (1) any judge or judges or
any division may request such hearing or rehearing, or (2) any party to a case may by
petition or motion request en bane proceedings. These :requests and petitions are submitted
to and ruled upon by all of the active circuit judges of the circuit. For cases ordering
rehearings en bane, see Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., note 2 supra, at 1021.
17Note 4 supra.
18 In at least one state jurisdiction, a party may under certain circumstances obtain a
rehearing en bane as a matter oE right. Mo. Const., art. V, §9 (e.g., when there is a dissent
after a divisional hearing).
10 United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 at 589, 68 S.Ct. 1169 (1948).
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the procedure adopted by the court of appeals must not indiscriminately curtail
the use of the en bane power by preventing-a litigant from suggesting that
his case is an appropriate one to be reheard by the full court, or by precluding
independent consideration of the merits of such suggestion. To the extent
that this holding indirectly entitles the litigant to compel some consideration
of the en bane issue, it renders possible an increase in the burdens of the
court2° and an additional delay and eJ..'Pense in obtaining final judgment. However, it would seem that if adequate consideration was given cases when
originally assigned to divisions for hearing, this additional burden would be
slight, even in a circuit in which the litigant is allowed to petition the full
court. The question presented for determination would go only to the procedural issue and would require investigation somewhat comparable to that
of the Supreme Court in considering petitions for ·writs of certiorari.21 Compensating factors are found in the wider exchange of opinion within the
circuits and in the avoidance of intra-circuit conflicts.
Raymond R. Trombadore, S.Ed.

20 For rules by which the court of appeals could minimize increase 0£ volume of petitions, see Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., note 2 supra, at 1020. Also, see
the rules of procedure prescribed in the Third Circuit and the comment thereon in 14
F.R.D. 91 (1953). Following the decision of the principal case, the rules for the Ninth
Circuit were amended by the addition 0£ two paragraphs. "All petitions for :rehearing shall
be addressed to and be determined by the court as constituted in the original hearing. Should
a majority 0£ the court as so constituted grant a rehearing and either from a suggestion 0£ a
party or upon its own motion be 0£ the opinion that the case should be :reheard en bane,
they shall so inform the Chief Judge. The Chief Judge shall thereupon convene the active
judges 0£ the court and the court shall thereupon determine whether the case should be
reheard en bane." Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., (9th Cir. 1953) 205 F.
(2d) 374 at 375. For application 0£ the amended rule see Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western
Pac. R. Co., (9th Cir. 1953) 206 F. (2d) 495, in which the petitions for hearing and
:rehearing en bane were denied by the division.
21 Cr. Boskey, ''Mechanics 0£ the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction," 46 CoL.
L. REv. 255 (1946).

